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In the XVII Century, the use of metaphor and analogy mainlycharacterize aesthetics essays, in which it is constant a recall tothe Leibnitian je ne sais quoi. As Elio Franzini writes, one of themain characteristics of the XVII Century thought is to bring backthe perception of art or its production to a je ne sais quoi or to asixth sense1. Rhetoric acquires, then, an important position in thephilosophical research. Philosophy, in fact, takes to recur anincreasing number of times to symbolization or metaphorizationin order to explain elements, not only aesthetic, that slip out of aconceptual definition. Although Kant is always cautious in usingthe instruments of rhetoric2, the use of metaphor in his works hasbeen recognized by many scholars as a peculiar element of criticalphilosophy3. Already Hans Vaihinger suggested an interpretationof Kant «als Metaphoriker»4.Kant’s metaphors must be considered not as symbols or alle-gories, that refers to a further content, but rather as similitudes orfigures of speech that clarify philosophical argumentations. Alsofor this reason, among Kant’s metaphors, there is a large use ofimages that refer to geography or to the semantic area of theearth. Metaphors that suggest images of the earth, of the territoryor of the geographical space normally hint back to gründlich, fun-damental concepts of critical philosophy and they are witness of a
1 See E. Franzini, Estetica del Settecento, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1995, p. 25.2 See G. Garelli, L’oceano della ragione: metafore kantiane, Milano, Cuem, 1996, p. 19.3 See: H. Vaihinger, Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Stuttgart, Spermann,1922, vol. 1, p. VII-IX; Id., Kant – ein Metaphysiker?, in F. Myrho (hrsg.), Kritizismus,Berlin, Pan Verlag Rolf Heise, 1926, pp. 64-73; J. Ortega y Gasset, Las dos grandes
metaforas, in Id., Obras Completas, vol. 2, Madrid, Taurus, 1966, p. 387; R. Assunto,
Prefazione, in I. Kant, Scritti precritici, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1982, p. X.4 See G. Garelli, L’oceano della ragione: metafore kantiane cit., p. 33.
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systematic, constructive and definitive instance5. In this article, Iwould like to analyze a Kantian metaphor that refer to one of themain concept of critical philosophy, that is the delimitation ofreason. The aim of my article is to recognize in H.S. Reimarus oneof the possible source for such a metaphor.
1. Limits and boundaries: Reimarus as Kant’s sourceIn Was heisst: sich im Denken orientieren? Kant asks: «for withwhat right will anyone prohibit reason – once it has, by his ownadmission, achieved success in this field – from going still fartherin it? And where then is the boundary at which it must stop?»6. So,Kant seems to ask himself: is it really possible to determine thelimit between the field of possibility and that of impossibility, in anecessary rigorous and definitive way?Examining the concept of boundary of reason we refer, then,to the foundations of critical philosophy: in the Kritik der reinen
Vernunft, in fact, Kant observes that «the highest concept withwhich one is accustomed to begin a transcendental philosophy isusually the division between the possible and the impossible»7. Inthis regard, as R. Eisler stresses8, the Kantian semantic distinctionbetween Schranke (limit) and Grenze (boundary), to which fewspecific studies are dedicated, it is absolutely determinant forcritical philosophy9. The distinction between Schranke and Gren-
5 Ibid., p. 36.6 I. Kant, Was heisst: sich im Denken orientieren?, in Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. VIII, hrsg.von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1912,p. 137 (I. Kant, What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?, in Religion and rational
theology, ed. by A.W. Wood and G. Di Giovanni, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,2001, p. 11).7 KrV, B346/A290 (I. Kant, Critique of pure reason, ed. by P. Guyer and A.W. Wood,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 382).8 See the voice Grenze in Kant Lexicon, bearbeitet von R. Eisler, Hildescheim, Olms, 1961.9 A. Gentile writes that, by inspecting the Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte (Bonn), it has to benoted that there is no study about the structure and the linguistic-semantic distinctionbetween Grenze e Schranke. The Kantian notion of ‘limit’ has never been considered as itdeserves by the historical and critical literature, but it has a very important role in thestudy of the transcendental philosophy (A. Gentile, Ai confini della ragione. La nozione di
‘limite’ nella filosofia trascendentale di Kant, Roma, Studium, 2003, p. 194, nota 1). Inaddition to the work of A. Gentile, the following studies on the problem of limit have tobe considered: the chapter Limiti e confini in E. Franzini, Filosofia dei sentimenti, Milano,Mondadori, 1997, pp. 98-107; L. Illetterati, Figure del limite: esperienze e forme della
finitezza, Trento, Verifiche, 1996; P. Faggiotto, ‘Limiti’ e ‘confini’ della conoscenza umana
secondo Kant. Commento al paragrafo 57 dei ‘Prolegomeni’, in «Verifiche» 15/3 (1986),pp. 231-242.
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ze10 was already present in the cultural environment in whichKant wrote and it is used by several authors. I think, however, thatit could be significant to refer back to Hermann Samuel Reimarus’
Vernunftlehre as a possible source for Kant11.Hermann Samuel Reimarus is certainly well known for histheological writings, quoted in the Critique of judgment12 andinterpreted by Lessing13. Also his writing on logic, unexpectedly,
10 The distinction between Schranke e Grenze creates a lot of translation problems. Inthis regard, see the note of Claudio Cesa (G.W.F. Hegel, Scienza della Logica, Roma-Bari,Laterza, 1974, pp. XLI-XLII) in which he writes that the distinction between Schrankeand Grenze is present, more or less unaltered, in all German Idealism.11 Due to the particularity of the subject, there is any critical study on the relationshipbetween Kant and the Vernunftlehre of Reimarus. There are still a lot of ideas in Logik im
Zeitalter der Aufklärung (See W. Walter - L. Borinski (hrsg.), Logik im Zeitalter der
Aufklärung. Studien zur Vernunftlehre von Hermann Samuel Reimarus, Veröff. JoachimJungius-Ges. Wiss. Hamburg, 38, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980). A referenceto this relationship stay in the work of Paola Rumore, who, referring to the work ofHinske, writes that Reimarus establishes in his Vernunftlehre the parallel, dear to Kant,between natural laws and understanding laws (P. Rumore, L’Ordine delle idee. La genesi
del concetto di ‘rappresentazione’ in Kant attraverso le sue fonti wolffiane (1747-1787),Firenze, Le Lettere, 2007, p. 105). Manfred Kühn affirms that Reimarus was influencedmore by Locke than by Wolff, by demonstrating that he paid more attention to thepsychological observation (M. Kühn, Der Objektbegriff bei Christian Wolff und Immanuel
Kant, in H. Klemme (hrsg.), Aufklärung und Interpretation. Studien zu Kants Philosophie
und ihren Umkreis. Tagung aus Anlass des 60. Geburstages von Reinhardt Brandt,Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, 1999, p. 42). Some important informations onReimarus are given by the Introduction of Frieder Lötzsch in the 1979 edition of the
Vernunftlehre (F. Lötzsch, Vorbericht des Herausgebers, in H.S. Reimarus, Vernunftlehre,München, Carl Hanser Verlag, 1979). Some elements on the Urteilstheorie of  Reimarusare highlighted in the Einleitung of Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann (W. Schmidt-Biggemann, Einleitung, in H.S. Reimarus, Kleine gelehrte Schriften. Vorstufen zur Apologie
oder Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes, Veröff. Joachim Jungius-Ges. Wiss.Hamburg, 79, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994, pp. 9-65). Finally, in order tohave a general idea on Reimarus and his relationship with the Enlightment, see:
Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768) ein ‘bekannter Unbekannter’ der Aufklärung in
Hamburg, Veröff. Joachim Jungius-Ges. Wiss. Hamburg, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht, 1973.12 By discussing the relationship between teleology and theology, Kant affirms thatReimarus has proposed that natural finality is a proof of the existence of God: «thisargument taken from physical teleology is worthy of honor. It produces the sameconviction in the common understanding and the most subtle thinker; and a Reimarus,who fully expounded this proof in his still unsurpassed work (Die vornehmsten
Wahrheiten der natürlichen Religion, 1754) with the thoroughness and claritycharacteristic of him, has thereby earned immortal merit» (KU, p. 477 [I. Kant, Critique of
the power of judgment, ed. by P. Guyer, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.340]).13 Between 1774 and 1778, Lessing published seven fragments of a theologicalmanuscript of H.S. Reimarus in Beyträge zur Geschichte und Literatur aus dem Schätzen
der Herzoglichen Bibliothek zu Wolfenbüttel. After the publication of Reimarus’fragments and the consequent well known discussion (Fragmentenstreit), Lessing publi-
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could represent an important Kantian source. This affirmation isbased on two different consideration: Reimarus’ Logic constitutesa significant turning point in the Wolffian school and it expressesthe attempt to read the distinction between limits and boundariesin a systematic perspective, as Kant will do.Norbert Hinske, who realizes one of the few studies on therelationship between Kant and the Reimarus’ Vernunftlehre,identifies three different elements that proves the influence of thistext on the Kantian thought14. First of all, an statement by JohannGottfried Hasse, who writes that «between philosophers, for him(Kant) Reimarus stays above all»15. Moreover, Arthur Wardaconfirms that Kant has read Reimarus’ Vernunftlehre, testifyingthat in his library there was a copy of the first edition (1756) ofReimarus’ treatise16. Finally, in the essay on negative magnitudes(1763), Kant explicitly quotes Reimarus’ Vernunftlehre and writes:«reference can be made, for instance, to the logic of Reimarus,which considers the phenomenon»17.These elements don’t eliminate the hypothetical importanceof Reimarus for Kant, but the influence of Vernunftlehre is evidentif we consider his content. The elements that join Reimarus’ andKantian treatment of limits and boundaries are mainly three: theconcept of philosophy as court for reason, the relationshipbetween reason and thing in itself and the autonomy of therational capacity. To these elements we have to add that bothReimarus and Kant employ metaphors by using a geographicalvocabulary. In this semantic area, the delineation of limits andboundaries of reason allows to determine the territory of possi-
shed the Antifragmenten (G.E. Lessing, Sämtliche Schriften, hrsg. von K. Lachmann, Bd.XXII, XXIII, Goschen, Stuttgart-Leipzig, 1886-1924).14 See N. Hinske, Reimarus zwischen Wolff und Kant. Zur Quellen-und Wirkungsgeschichte
der Vernunftlehre von Hermann Samuel Reimarus, in W. Walter - L. Borinski (hrsg.), Logik
im Zeitalter der Aufklärung. Studien zur Vernunftlehre von Hermann Samuel Reimarus,Veröff. Joachim Jungius-Ges. Wiss. Hamburg, 38, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,1980, p. 20.15 J.G. Hasse, Der alte Kant, Hasse’s Schrift: Letzte Äußerungen Kants und persönliche
Notizen aus dem opus postumum, Berlin-Leipzig, A. Buchenau und G. Lehmann, 1925, p.30.16 A. Warda, Immanuel Kant Bücher. Bibliographien und Studien, Bd. III, Berlin, M.Breslauer, 1922, p. 53.17 I. Kant, Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen, in
Gesammelte Schriften, Band II, hrsg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie derWissenschaften, Berlin, Reimer, 1912, p. 191 (I. Kant, Attempt to introduce the concept of
negative magnitudes into philosophy, in theoretical philosophy (1755-1770), Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 229).
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bility of reason and to draw the map which pick off the systematicunity. Reimarus and Kant, then, belong to the same culturalenvironment that use metaphor to determine those elements thatslip out of a conceptual definition and that refer to a geographicalvocabulary in order to underline the determined nature of boun-dary and the poorly defined nature of limit.
2. The distinction between limes and terminus and the court
of reason: the geographical metaphorAs it is well known, in the Prolegomena Kant distinguishes thenotion of limit and that of boundary: boundary defines a closedand determined space, it defines reason and her correct use insideexperience. Limit, instead, is a «negative magnitude», because itindicates what is over phenomenical boundary, it indicates sowhat reason can’t achieve: the noumenon. Kant writesboundaries (Grenzen) (in extended things) always presuppose a spacethat is found outside a certain fixed location, and that encloses thatlocation; limits (Schranken) require nothing of the kind, but are merenegations that affect a magnitude insofar as it does not possess absolutecompleteness. Our reason, however, sees around itself as it were a spacefor the cognition of things in themselves, although it can never havedeterminate concepts of those things and is limited to appearancesalone.18In this regard, Elio Franzini’s analysis interestingly claims thatKant employs a geographical vocabulary in order to draw a map ofreason. In this perspective, the distinction between limits andboundaries becomes crucial, since limits can be crossed, butboundaries have to be grounded in relation to experience. In fact,with reference to the experience of boundaries and through thecrossing of limits, we can find the rule for the foundation ofknowledge and its territory19.This consideration is based on the distinction betweenphenomenon and noumenon. Thanks to this distinction, thesubject could experience boundaries and this is her cognitivehorizon; but we cannot have an experience of limits, that bring tocontradictions on a cognitive and theoretical level20.
18 Prol., p. 352 (I. Kant, Prolegomena to any future metaphysics, in Theoretical philosophy
after 1781, ed. by H. Allison and P. Lauchlann Heath, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2002, p. 106).19 E. Franzini, Filosofia dei sentimenti cit., p. 99.20 Ibid., p. 101.
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In the distinction between Schranke and Grenze it is socentral their semantic definition that occurs, as Franzini stresses,with a geographical vocabulary. Such an interpretation is con-firmed by what Kant writes, in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft:if I represent the surface of the earth (in accordance with sensibleappearance) as a plate, I cannot know how far it extends. But experienceteaches me this: that wherever I go, I always see a space around me inwhich I could proceed farther; thus I cognize the limits (Schranken) ofmy actual knowledge of the earth at any time, but not the boundaries(Grenzen) of all possible description of the earth. But if I have gotten asfar as knowing that the earth is a sphere and its surface the surface of asphere, then from a small part of the latter, e.g., from the magnitude ofone degree, I can cognize its diameter and, by means of this, the completeboundary, i.e., surface of the earth, determinately and in accordance witha priori principles; and although I am ignorant in regard to the objectsthat this surface might contain, I am not ignorant in regard to themagnitude and limits of the domain that contains them.21In the first Critique, it is then evident how Kant use the geo-graphical language in order to describe the delimitation of reason.It is clearly determinant the influence of the astronomical studiesaccomplished by Kant and, most of all, in the first Critique, thereference to Galileo and Copernicus is absolutely crucial. With myanalysis, I would rather like to stress that the distinction between
Schranke and Grenze and the use of geographical language wasalready present in the Wolffian school. In particular, I would liketo state that it is possible to retrace one of Kantian source in the
Vernunftlehre of Hermann Samuel Reimarus. Reimarus, in fact,writes:we talk a lot about limit (Schranke) of reason and everyone says that ourreason is limited; commonly, rather boundaries (Grenzen) of reasoncannot be determined by laws, so lords cannot establish boundaries oftheir territories through series of peace treaties.22Even thought Reimarus’ metaphor is definitely less articulatedthan the Kantian one, the aim of drawing the «territory of the pureintellect», as Kant writes in the Analytic of principles, is alreadypresent in the Vernunftlehre.
21 KrV, B787/A759 (p. 653).22 H.S. Reimarus, Vernunftlehre, hrsg. v. F. Lötzsch, München,Carl Hanser Verlag, 1979, p.42.
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The Reimarus’ distinction between Schranke and Grenze,aside from being expressed by a geographical metaphor, is alsocoherent with the Kantian statement in Vorlesungen über Metha-
physik und Rationaltheologie: «Limes (Schranke) ist unterschiedenvon terminus (Grenze)»23. Already in Latin, limes and terminushave a geographical connotation. Terminus (Grenze, boundary)means the end of a territory, fixes a determination and outlines aspace of unattainable. Limes (Schranke, limit) fixes, on thecontrary, a boundary poorly determined, means something nega-tive, the incompleteness poorly defined of a whole.Also in Reimarus, boundary has to be well determined,according to logical laws of contradiction, while limit refers tosomething obscure, undetermined, something that, for thesereasons, has to be expressed with clearness and distinction. Thisseparation between limes and terminus has been already used byLeibniz for its relevance in the method of infinitesimal calculus.The presence of this separation in the Vernunftlehre means,however, her diffusion in the German thought of the XVII Centuryand, in particular, in the Wolffian school. Furthermore, the use of
Schranke and Grenze with the same meaning of limes and terminussubscribes a geographical semantic area that refers to anothergeographic metaphor: tracing boundaries of reason meansdrawing its map; it also means then taking its systematic whole.Stressing the use of metaphor and the geographical languageallows us, therefore, to identify the close link between thedelimitation of reason and the aim of building an unitary systemthat involves the relationship between reason and experience.By deviating, in fact, from the Wolffian philosophy, whichconsidered experience only as the starting point providing mate-rials to reason, Reimarus, on one hand, defines the relationshipbetween reason and experience as the ground for the systematicdrawing and, on the other hand, by distinguishing between
Schranke and Grenze, expresses the necessity of tracing theboundaries of reason with reference to the empiric. The delimit-tation of reason happens, in fact, according to natural laws, inrelationship with experience, which is no longer considered as
23I. Kant, Vorlesungen über Metaphysik und Rationaltheologie, in Kants Gesammelte
Schriften, Bd. 28, hrsg. von der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Berlin-Leipzig, De Gruyter, 1968, p. 644. (see A. Gentile, Ai confini della ragione cit., pp. 200-202).
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source of materials for reason, but as drawing that refers to theapplication field of knowledge.By anticipating a metaphor dear to Kant, Reimarus suggestsa study of reason that take the rational capacity in front of a court.He aims thus at identifying, in his Vernunftlehre, the possibility ofreason according to its correct use24. As Norbert Hinske writes,even considering only the aims of Reimarus and the use of themetaphor of court, it is possible to identify the deep resemblancebetween the Vernunftlehre and the Kantian Critique. Reimarusseems, in fact, to mark a breaking point in the Wolffian school, bygoing in the same direction that, some years after, will be that ofKant. In the distinction between limits and boundaries and in theaim of taking reason in front of a court in order to establish itscorrect use, Reimarus seems to propose a new concept ofphilosophy.In the Wolff’s Psychologia empirica, as Jean Ecole hashighlighted, the delimitation of reason and the relationship withexperience are necessary, but not fundamental. Wolff is inte-rested, in fact, in the architectonical structure of reason, andexperience is only the starting point for rational activity. Rei-marus, instead, puts the relationship between reason and expe-rience, that is between subject and world, at the foundation of hissystem, as also Kant does. Delimiting reason means regulating, ina systematic way, the relationship between sensibility andintelligible capacity. In this regard, Hans-Jürgen Engfer, in hisessay on the Reimarus’ theory of judgment, writes that this authorforms, «while remaining in the Wolffian philosophy, a turningpoint, that in the Sixties and Seventies acts as a foundation of anEnlightenment philosophy that interprets herself analytically»25.Remembering the importance of Reimarus could be, therefore,useful not only in order to reconstruct Kantian sources, but also inorder to highlight the fundamental Kantian matter of the deli-mitation of rational boundaries into the relationship betweenreason and experience.
24 Hinske states in fact that the use of some important metaphors in Kantian thought(among which the court of reason) could come from Reimarus’ Vernunftlehre: Hinskeremembers however that the same metaphors are also in J.H. Lambert Organon (see N.Hinske, Reimarus zwischen Wolff und Kant cit., pp. 21-22).25 H.-J. Engfer, Die Urteilstheorie von H. S. Reimarus und die Stellung seiner Vernunftlehre
zwischen Wolff und Kant, in W. Walter und L. Borinski (hrsg.), Logik im Zeitalter der
Aufklärung cit., p. 58.
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3. The boundary concept: the thing in itselfAs I said, while describing the relationship between reason andthing in itself, Reimarus establishes the boundaries of reason bydistinguishing Schranke and Grenze and by using a geographicalmetaphor. Reimarus, moreover, as Kant will do, would establishwhat is the territory of intellect in order to define a criterion oftruth in the path of knowledge. In the Critique of pure reason, Kant,in fact, writes:we have now not only traveled through the land of pure understanding,and carefully inspected each part of it, but we have also surveyed it, anddetermined the place for each thing in it. This land, however, is an island,and enclosed in unalterable boundaries (Grenzen) by nature itself. It isthe land of truth (a charming name), surrounded by a broad and stormyocean, the true set of illusion, where many a fog bank and rapidly meltingiceberg pretend to be new lands […]. But before we venture on this sea,to search through all its breadth and become certain of whether there isanything to hope for in it, it will be useful first to cast yet another glanceat the map of the land that we would now leave, and to ask […] by whattitle we occupy even this land, and can hold it securely against all hostileclaims26.Here Kant deals with the problem of boundary and limit, by usinga geographical language and he puts the distinction between
Schranke and Grenze in relationship with Grenzbegriff, theboundary concept, that is the noumenon. The definition of rationalboundaries becomes, then, the central problem in critical philo-sophy: the relationship between phenomenon and noumenon27.Also in the Vernunftlehre the boundary definition directlyinvolves the relationship between reason and thing in itself, inorder to identify a criterion of truth. The terms used by Reimarusare still Wolffian and he clearly doesn’t refer to the idea of
noumenon as Grenzbegriff. The problem of the relationship bet-ween reason and thing in itself is rather in connection with boun-dary and seems to have a lot in common with Kantian philosophy.In Reimarus’ Logic, limits of reason, determinable by laws, consistin being or not being able to represent the thing in itself in a clearand distinct way. Boundaries of reason are defined, instead,according to natural laws, contradiction and agreement. Limits ofreason, then, could be abstractly established according to acriterion of clearness and distinction, but boundaries of reason
26 KrV B294-295/A236 (pp. 338-339).27 See A. Gentile, Ai confini della ragione cit., p. 236.
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have to be searched out in nature. Nature defines the correct useof our rational faculty and describes the «map of reason».Similarly, the delimitation of a territory couldn’t be defined onlyby formal treatises, but has to take into account, most of all, thegeographical conformation of nature.If, on one hand, Reimarus uses a still Wolffian language, inwhich terms as Klarheit and Deutlichkeit are central, on the otherhand, the resemblance with critical philosophy is surprising; atleast, as Norbert Hinske argues, the position of the matter isidentical28. In fact, if terms of clearness and obscurity are notpresent in Kantian philosophy they are rather a reason of con-troversy with Baumgarten29, the relationship with nature and itslaws is undoubtedly fundamental in the definition of the bounda-ries of reason.The fact that Reimarus puts the distinction between limitsand boundaries of reason identifies a conception of the rationalfaculty very different from the Wolffian position. In a Wolffiansense, drawing limits of reason means to identify its possiblefunctions and its architecture; determining its boundaries means,instead, to show the correct use of reason. For this reason,Reimarus writes that rational laws, grounded on nature, establishintellect boundaries30 and reason is delimitated by the clearnessof representation and the law of identity and no contradiction31.In particular, according to Reimarus32, it is possible to have acorrect use of reason only into limits of a clear and distinctrepresentation. What joins Kant to Reimarus is, therefore, thesame conception of reason, defined not according to its parts, asWolff did, but according to its usage, both theoretical or moral. Inthis regard it is interesting that also Reimarus distinguish atheoretical and a moral application of reason.
28 See N. Hinske, Reimarus zwischen Wolff und Kant cit., p. 22.29 See at this regard Erleuterungen zur Psychologia empirica in A. G. Baumgartens
Metaphysica, in I. Kant, Handschriftlicher Nachlass, in Gesammelte Schriften, Band XV,hrsg. v. P. Menzer, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1911, pp. 3-54. In regard to the relationshipbetween Kant and Baumgarten see C. La Rocca, Das Schöne und der Schatten. Dunkle
Vorstellungen und ästhetische Erfahrung zwischen Baumgarten und Kant, in H.F. Klemme- M. Pauen - M.L. Raters (hrsg.), Im Schatten des Schönen. Die Ästhetik des Häßlichen in
historischen Ansätzen und aktuellen Debatten, Bielefeld, Aisthesis Verlag, 2006, pp. 19-64.30 See H.S. Reimarus, Vernunftlehre cit., p. 20.31See Ibid., p. 42.32 See Ibid., p. 45.
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Obviously, in Reimarus any critical systematic issue, com-parable to the Kantian Critique, is missing. For Kant the rela-tionship between sensible and supersensible plays a crucial role,and he tries to identify a middle term in the power of judgmentthrough the principle of natural finality33. Reimarus, instead,seems happy to stop his research to the identification of the limitsof reason in natural laws, of identity and contradiction, that makesa clear representation of the object possible. It is interesting,however, to remark that Reimarus suggest the existence of arelationship between reason and thing in itself. This relationshipcould anticipates the Kantian concept of limit, even if Reimarusdoesn’t refer to the supersensible in relationship with boundariesof reason. By showing boundaries of rational activity, in fact,Reimarus writes:when we have determined the concept of the faculty of reason, so it is allsolved thank to that. Truth is accordance of our thinking with things andaccording to this we think. This logical truth in thinking (veritas in
cogitando) implies also a metaphysical or substantial truth (veritatem in
essendo) in the thing in itself. […] For this reason, things have inthemselves their essential truth, according to laws of contradiction andaccordance, with which our natural faculty of reason agrees in thinking.34Undoubtedly, totally similar idea was already present in Wolff’s
Philosophia prima, in which the «veritas transcendentalis» of thething in itself is affirmed35. Wolff, however, doesn’t admit anotherfundament, as natural laws, for the relationship between reasonand thing in itself. It is the theological validity or the thing in itselfthat could function as ground. For Wolff, besides, was impossibleto think to a metaphysical presupposition that stay beyond logicaltruth36. In Wolff’s writings we have then a definition of the limitsof reason, but no definition of its boundaries.Reimarus, instead, affirms that truth could be find only inrelationship between reason and thing in itself and in thisagreement the correct use of reason according to natural lawscould be established. Similarly Kant affirms that when meta-
33 See KU, pp. 219-221 (pp. 21-24).34 H.S. Reimarus, Venunftlehre cit., p. 38-39.35 «Si nulla datur in rebus veritas transcendentalis, nec datur veritas logica propositionum
universalium, nec singularium datur nisi in instanti» (C. Wolff, Philosophia prima sive
ontologia, in Christian Wolff Gesammelte Werke, hrsg. v. J. Ecole und H.W. Arndt, IIAbteilung, Band 3, Hildescheim, Georg Olms Verlag, 1962, p. 385).36 See ibid., pp. 385-387.
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physics is intended as science, it provides «satisfactory proof ofthe laws that are the a priori ground of nature, as the sum total ofobjects of experience»37. The meaning of thing in itself in Kant iscertainly much deeper and definitively different from that ofReimarus. I believe, however, that it is interesting that in Rei-marus, and then in Kant, the concept of thing in itself is fullydeterminant for the identification of the boundaries of reason. Asit is well known, in fact, the distinction between limits and boun-daries is strictly connected to the distinction between phenol-
menon and noumenon, thanks to which it is possible to knowlimits, but not boundaries (Grenzbegriff, that is noumenon) of rea-son. This is probably the point where the biggest distance bet-ween Reimarus and Kant, as regards their analysis of boundary, ismore apparent. The experience of boundary, indeed, with refe-rence to the noumenon clearly constitutes, in the Kantian thought,a «Copernican Revolution» within the philosophical tradition. ForReimarus the relationship with the thing in itself becomes acriterion of truth and the laws inscribed in nature are somethingto which reason has to confirm itself. Kant, instead, as he writes at§ 57 of Prolegomena, admits the existence of the thing in itself asthe very ground and condition of possibility of phenolmenon. Forthis reason, in the first Critique, Kant supports that the noumenonis just a boundary concept (Grenzbegriff), and it has to circum-scribe sensibility. The noumenon has, so, a merely negative modeof employment38.In this regard, Pietro Faggiotto claims that Kant’s realproblem is not how to infer the existence of intelligible being, butrather how to necessarily determine them without empiricalcontamination39. According to Faggiotto, the problem of boundaryin Kant doesn’t consist in a trying to put supersensible objects innature, but rather it consists in an effort to describe the rela-tionship between sensible and intelligible world. Differently fromReimarus, Kant is not interested in the agreement with theidentity and contradiction laws, but in the relationship betweensensible and supersensible as a boundary relationship. The distin-ction between limit and boundary defines, then, a knowledgerelationship; it doesn’t describe ontological regions of reality, but
37 KrV, BXIX (p. 111).38 See E. Franzini, Filosofia dei sentimenti cit., p. 101.39 P. Faggiotto, ‘Limiti’ e ‘confini’ della conoscenza umana secondo Kant cit., p. 237.
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rather defines the territorial paths of thinking40. Boundary, in fact,indentifies the correct use of reason referring to experience andputs the existence of the thing in itself as condition of possibilityof experience. Limit, that reason tries to overcome every time,establishes the relationship between sensible and supersensible.There are several self-evident differences between the
Vernunftlehre and the Critique of pure reason; but Reimarus,similarly to Kant and differently to Wolff, considers the rela-tionship between reason and the thing in itself as a fundamentalelement in rational limits definition. For Reimarus, describing themap of reason, by identifying limits and boundaries, meansfollowing natural laws, by searching truth of the thing in itself andby finding in experience the systematic ground of reason. Simi-larly, for Kant, investigating intellectual territory means esta-blishing limits between sensible and intelligible, through a define-tion of the relationship between phenomenon and the thing in it-self.
4. Boundary, autonomy and systemThe relationship between empiric and noumenon, that defines thedistinction between limit and boundary, remains a distance pointbetween Reimarus and Kant. But there subsists many otherselements in the Vernunftlehre, that can be considered as anti-cipation of Kantian elements. First of all, Reimarus claims thatboundaries of reason can’t be defined according to abstract laws,thus anticipating the Kantian necessity to establish a priori thedelimitation of rational faculty. Reimarus, in fact, supports thatdelimitation of territories must has to follow the geographicalconformation of territory; similarly, the map of reason has to betraced following natural boundaries, that in Kantian languagemeans the impossibility to go over boundaries of experience.For Kant, the determination of boundary and the referenceto limits of reason define, in fact, the critical use of philosophy.Thanks to the geographical metaphor already quoted, if we thinkof the surface of the Earth as a flat surface, we can know its limitsfrom time to time, but we can’t a priori know boundaries of thesurface in its whole. It is the case of sciences, as Math and Physics,which limits are constantly moving as the horizon. Sciences could,in fact, progress indefinitely in their research. If we think, instead,
40E. Franzini, Filosofia dei sentimenti cit., p. 99.
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of Earth as spherical, a little part of it is enough to determineextension, diameter and limits; by determining the finiteness ofsurface, it is possible to fully identify its unity and completeness.Critical philosophy, in fact, knows its own boundaries andtherefore doesn’t strain indefinitely to a unattainable limit, but itis defined by the boundary and by the relationship with what isbeyond its limit. Andrea Gentile consistently claims that thepossibility of determining its own boundaries gives to reason theprivilege of being autonomous and the legislator of itself. Critique,according to Gentile, doesn’t mean only the examination ofboundaries, but also the analysis of the internal structure ofknowledge41.In the Kantian distinction between limits and boundaries, wecan find, therefore, an idea of reason as legislator of itself, assomething autonomous and that affirms the possibility of beingcomprehended in a systematic unity by determining its ownboundaries. Kant, in fact, in the first Critique, claims that reason isgrounded in itself; it is «a unity entirely separate and subsistingfor itself, in which, as in an organized body, every part exists forthe sake of all the others as all the others exist for its sake»42.Similarly, Reimarus writes that we «have fundaments of the entire
Vernunftlehre in front of eyes»43; reason naturally has its ownrules and it has to do nothing but applying them in its relationshipwith the world. Reason finds its ground in nature and determinesits own limits according to given natural laws. Thus, it has not totake its rules from philosophy, from logic or from some theory ofknowledge. As Norbert Hinske writes, in the Reimarus’ Vernun-
ftlehre, «reason becomes its own source, grounded in itself; itbecomes its own a priori rule, it becomes literally autonomous»44.By determining autonomy of reason, Reimarus completelymoves away from Wolff and he puts the basis for an idea ofreason, that finds its ground and its boundaries in itself; this ideaof reason will be the Kantian one. According to Reimarus, science,so, is not a set of theories which unity has to be deduced. Phi-losophy as science consists instead in the correct use of reasonaccording to rules given by nature, that is contradiction rules,which establish boundaries of reason. By anticipating Kant, meta-
41 A. Gentile, Ai confini della ragione cit., p. 209.42 KrV, B XXIII (p. 113).43 H.S. Reimarus, Vernunftlehre cit., p. 51.44 N. Hinske, Reimarus zwischen Wolff und Kant cit., p. 25.
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physics as science consists in the critical use of philosophy. Only akind of philosophy that considers the rational faculty as auto-nomous and grounded in itself can, therefore, put reason in frontof a court.According to Reimarus, philosophy isscience of all fundamental theoretical and moral truths that explorehappiness in human beings […]. Because Philosophy is a science, inregard to all objects, it has to give a clear ground and a prove of all theconnected things to the found (gefunden) reason. 45Philosophy, then, can reach unity of reason, because it can auto-nomously establish its boundaries according to laws given bynature. So, also in Kant, critical philosophy can reach the syste-matic unity, by considering a priori limits of reason. In the Kantiandistinction between limits and boundariesthere is a second thing to be attended to, which is more philosophic and
architectonic: namely, to grasp correctly the idea of the whole and fromthis idea to see all those parts in their mutual relation by means of theirderivation from the concept of that whole in a pure rational faculty. Thisexamination and guarantee is possible only through the most intimateacquaintance with the system46.Although it is important to remember that in Reimarus transcend-dental intents cannot be found, I think it is however important tohighlight how, also in the Vernunftlehre, the distinction betweenlimits and boundaries is strictly connected both to the auto-nomous statute of reason and to the systematic unity betweennature and reason. These elements will be included by Kant in thetranscendental relationship between sensible and supersensible.That the problem of boundary is for Reimarus strictlyconnected to the problem of system is evident if we think thatboundaries of reason have to be found in nature, in which consiststhe ground of Reimarus’ philosophical system. Also in the Vernun-
ftlehre, so as in the Critique of pure reason, determining limits ofthe reason map means reaching the system in its whole anddefining the relationship between the intelligible faculty and thenatural sensible.
45 H.S. Reimarus, Venunftlehre cit.,  pp. 13-14.46 KpV, p. 10 (p. 144).
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This reconstruction of the relationship between the Reima-rus’ Vernunftlehre and Kantian thought, through an analysis of theuse of metaphor that defines boundaries of reason, aims athighlighting the numerous points in common between the twoauthors. In my analysis I tried, however, to keep the peculiarperspective of Kant always in mind.Reimarus’ Logic is not a text very well known by the scho-lars, but it was undoubtedly well known by Kant. This writingcould finally highlights the relationship between Kant and theWolffian school; Kant marks a definitive break with Wolff’s philo-sophy, but he could find anticipations of this departure in otherauthors and, among these, in Reimarus. Particularly, with the
Vernunftlehre, the relationship between reason and experiencebecomes systematic and not merely functional anymore;boundaries of reason, moreover, are indicated in nature. The focusshifts radically from the functions and parts of the rational facultyto the determination of boundaries in relationship with expe-rience. Reimarus thus describes reason as a systematic whole.The Vernunftlehre is therefore worthy of our attention, as inthis writing Reimarus recognizes a connection between the rela-tionship of reason with experience and the distinction betweenlimits and boundaries. Particularly, by distinguishing Schrankeand Grenze (as limes and terminus), Reimarus’ Logic anticipatesthe connection among the definition of the boundaries of reason,the affirmation of the thing in itself, the autonomy of the rationalfaculty and the effort towards an account of the systematic unityof reason in reference to experience. Finally, Reimarus uses, asKant does, a geographical language that allow to explain thedistinction between limits and boundaries with a metaphor andthat let describe boundaries of the rational territory through amap of its whole.
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